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Joinder of Liability Insurers as Parties-
Defendant-An Old Issue Reconsidered
Under Ohio's Civil Rules
The propriety and legality of joining a liability insurer as a party-
defendant have long been the subjects of debate. This Note reconsiders
the issues within the framework of the newly-enacted Ohio Rules of
Civil Procedure. The author submits that such joinder would eliminate
unnecessary procedural inefliciences and would further the scheme of lib-
eral discovery envisaged by the Rules. He argues that the new Ohio Rules
establish a departure from prior case law, and that under existing law
joinder of liability insurers is not only permitted, but is often required for
the effective operation of the Rules.
I. INTRODUCTION
Liability insurance companies ought to be named as parties de-
fendant because in all sincerity - and measured by all honest tests
- they are the real parties defendant.'
[Tjhe controversy in the personal injury action is a controversy
as to whether the insured is legally liable - . . . not whether he
will be able to pay, but whether he was at fault.2
T HESE CONFLICTING STATEMENTS briefly summarize the major
policy bases underlying both sides of the question of whether
liability insurance companies should be made parties in personal in-
jury litigation. Although joinder of an insurance company as a
party-defendant is certainly not a new controversy, the recent adop-
tion of a new Code of Civil Procedure in Ohio3 mandates a thor-
ough reconsideration of both the propriety and the legality of such
joinder.
Ohio law prior to the adoption of the new Rules did not permit
the joinder of an insurer as a party-defendant. 4  Under this tradi-
tional approach a plaintiff can bring an action against the defen-
dant's insurance company only after he has secured a judgment
against the defendant which has remained unsatisfied for 30 days.5
1 Shall Insurance Companies Be Named Parties Defendant in Actions for Injury or
Death?, 23 Ohio Op. 75, 77 (1942) (remarks of Marvin C. Harrison).
2Id. at 82 (remarks of Robert Guinther). But see note 66 infra & accompanying
text.
3 The Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure became effective July 1, 1970. These rules are
substantially the same as the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
4 See notes 98-108 infra & accompanying text.
5 OMo REV. CODE ANN. § 3929.06 (Page 1971). See notes 99-101 infra & accom-
panying text.
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However, the passage of the new Ohio Rules raises significant ques-
tions concerning the continued validity of prior Ohio law in this
area.
6
It has been suggested that the adoption of the new Rules may
permit a liability insurer to be joined with the tortfeasor as a party-
defendant, at least at the pleading stage of litigation 7  The pos-
sibility of joinder arises primarily under Ohio Rule 18(B), which
provides in pertinent part:
Whenever a claim is one heretofore cognizable only after another
claim has been prosecuted to a conclusion, the two claims may be
joined in a single action . .. In particular, a plaintiff may state
a claim for money and a claim to have set aside a conveyance fraud-
ulent as to him, without first having obtained a judgment establish-
ing the claim for money.8
Although this Rule specifically refers to the fraudulent conveyance
situation, the broad language appears sufficient to embrace the typi-
cal tort claim involving an insured defendant.9
Litigation involving an insured defendant would clearly be fa-
cilitated by allowing an injured plaintiff to initially join the insurer
as a party-defendant, at least for the purposes of pleading and pre-
trial discovery.10 Not only would the multiplicity of suits currently
necessary under section 3929.06, Ohio Revised Code (O.R.C.), be
eliminated by allowing such joinder,1 but in addition, and perhaps
more importantly, the plaintiff's ability to adequately prepare his case
would be greatly enhanced.
6 See notes 112-40 infra & accompanying text.
7 1 S. JACOBY, OHIO CIVIL PRACTIcE UNDER THE RULES 167 (1970); J. McCoR-
MAC, OHIO CIVIL RULES PRACTICE § 5.05, at 98 (1970).
8 OHIO R. Civ. P. 18(B) (emphasis added).
9 Rule 18(B) encompasses the joinder of remedies, or more properly, the joinder of
claims, one of which is contingent upon the outcome of the other. Although it is pos-
sible that the claims sought to be joined will be against different persons, Rule 18(B)
does not deal with the joinder of parties. Where the claims which 18 (B) permits to
be joined are against different persons, Rule 20(A) may be used to join them as parties.
See 1 S. JACOBY, supra note 7, at 195. The crucial inquiry, therefore, remains whether
the claims may be joined under 18(B), which, on its face, appears applicable to the
contingent insurer-insured situation. The Ohio Rules Advisory Comm. Staff Notes
to Rule 18(B), however, state that "Rule 18(B) is not intended to permit the joinder
of a defendant's liability insurer in the original tort action. See Pennsylvania R.R. v.
Lattavo Brothers, Inc., 9 F.R.D. 205 (N.D. Ohio 1949)." In spite of this Staff Note,
which is neither official nor dispositive, OHIO REV. CODE ANN., CIVIL RULES VOL.
at xi (Page 1971), it seems clear that Lattavo is no longer controlling. See notes
133-40 infra & accompanying text.
10 Permitting joinder merely for the purposes of pleading and discovery may be
accomplished through the use of separate trials under Ohio Rules 20(B), 21, or 42(B).
11 See generally Comment, Direct Actions Against Insurance Companies: Should
They Join the Party?, 59 CALIF. L. REV. 525, 543 (1971).
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II. DISCOVERY AND JOINDER:
THE NEED FOR THE INSURER TO BE A "PARTY"
Rules 26 through 37 and Rule 45 govern the scope and pro-
cedure of discovery. The broad function of the discovery devices
set forth in these Rules is to "make a trial less a game of blind-
man's buff and more a fair contest with the basic issues and facts
disclosed to the fullest practicable extent."' 2  Indeed, one of the
fears of adopting the Federal Rules in Ohio at an earlier date was
that such broad discovery devices would force adversaries to reveal
too much of their trial preparation material.'
Although the new Ohio Rules broaden the range of permissible
discovery, they by no means allow a generalized raid into opposing
counsel's files. A general statement to this effect is made in Ohio
Rule 26(A), which attempts to define and formulate policy regard-
ing the interpretation and scope of the discovery Rules.' 4 No cor-
responding statement accompanies Federal Rule 26. The Staff
Notes to Ohio Rule 26(A) 5 indicate that the purpose of the addi-
tion of such a policy paragraph was to reaffirm the principles of dis-
covery enunciated in the celebrated case of Hickman v. Taylor.'8
Undoubtedly, the broad import of Rule 26(A) may be read into
many situations, especially in regard to the general scope of dis-
covery'1 or that applicable to trial preparation materials.'? Although
12 United States v. Procter & Gamble, 356 U.S. 677, 682 (1968). See generally,
C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK ON THE LAw OF FEDmERAL COURTS § 81 (2d ed. 1970).
13 Shumaker, Should Ohio Adopt the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure?, 29 OHIO
BAR 43, 54 (1956).
14 OHIO R. Civ. P. 26(A) provides:
It is the policy of these rules (1) to preserve the right of attorneys to prepare
cases for trial with that degree of privacy necessary to encourage them to pre-
pare their cases thoroughly and to investigate not only the favorable but the un-
favorable aspects of such cases and (2) to prevent an attorney from taking un-
due advantage of his adversary's industry or efforts.
15 Ohio Rules Advisory Comm. Staff Notes to Rule 26(A) (1970).
16 329 U.S. 495 (1947). Under the Hickman holding, although the discovery
Rules are to be liberally interpreted, the "work product" of an attorney is to receive a
qualified immunity, and the party seeking disclosure of information so protected must
show the existence of special circumstances in order to obtain it. See 8 C. WRIGHT &
A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTIcE AND PROCEDURE § 2022 (1970).
17 OHIO R. Civ. P. 26(B)(1).
181d. 26(B)(3). This Rule permits a party to discover "documents and tangible
things prepared in antidpation of litigation or for trial by or for another party or by
or for that other party's representative (including his attorney, consultant, surety, indem-
nitor, insurer, or agent) only upon a showing of good cause therefor." This is a coi-
fication of the Hickman rule, extending the qualified immunity to representatives other
than the party's attorney. See note 16 supra & accompanying text. It should be noted
that while Rule 26(B)(3) sets forth the scope of discovery applicable to trial prepara-
tion materials, it does not provide the method for obtaining such materials. Therefore,
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the scope of allowable discovery may be tempered somewhat by
Rule 26(A), the broad purpose underlying discovery clearly remains
to provide parties with the opportunity to obtain the information
necessary to adequately prepare and conduct their respective cases.
The inability to join insurance companies as parties-defendant may
often have the effect of thwarting the scheme established by the
various discovery Rules for the satisfaction of this purpose.
The scheme established by the discovery Rules provides several
methods by which a party may seek to obtain the information he
desires, some of which are available only as to parties 9 while others
have general application.2" To illustrate the problems caused in
insurance litigation by the distinctions between the party and non-
party methods of discovery, let us assume a hypothetical set of facts:
a collision has occurred between an injured plaintiff and a defen-
dant who carries liability insurance. Further, the insurance com-
pany conducting the case for the defendant - a normal function of
a liability insurer2' - has taken witnesses' statements and photo-
graphs, gathered all the pertinent facts relating to the accident, and
retained defense counsel. The injured plaintiff then hires an attor-
ney and a lawsuit is initiated.
Plaintiff's attorney may want to know whether the defendant
is insured. As a practical matter this information allows the at-
torney to know who is directing the defense of the suit and who in
reality will be making possible offers of settlement. Both the Fed-
eral and Ohio Rules explicitly allow discovery of the existence
and contents of an insurance agreement. 2 By utilizing Ohio Rule
26(B) (2) to discover the existence of insurance, the plaintiff's at-
although it expressly mentions "insurers," providing their "work-product" with a quali-
fied immunity, Rule 26(B)(3) does not provide a basis for joining insurers as parties,
even during discovery. Furthermore, use of another of the discovery Rules, such as Rule
34, to obtain such materials, requires a showing of "good cause" under Ohio Rule
26(B)(3). The Federal Rules discarded the good cause standard in 1970. Now the
moving party in the federal system must show "substantial need of the materials in the
preparation of his case and that he is unable without undue hardship to obtain the
substantial equivalent of the materials by other means." FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3).
The different wording of the respective Rules should not provide different results,
however, since the stricter standards of the Federal Rules should be weighed against the
policy statements in Ohio Rule 26(A), which similarly restrict discovery in various
circumstances. See 1 S. JACOBY, supra note 7, at 260.
19 OHIO R. CIV. P. 33, 34.
20 Id. 30, 31.
21 See Comment, Direct Actions, supra note 11, at 542 & n.105.
2 2 OHIO R. Civ. P. 26(B)(2); FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2). Prior to the adoption of
this Rule the courts and commentators were split on the issue of allowing discovery of
insurance policies. See 8 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 16, § 2010, at 85-89.
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torney is better able to make some important practical decisions re-
garding settlement and trial preparation.
Normally the plaintiff's attorney will also seek other information
which will be valuable to the preparation of his case. Several meth-
ods of discovery may be used. He may acquire this information by
sending interrogatories to the defendant pursuant to Ohio Rule
33. It is permissible to request the names and addresses of all
witnesses to the accident a Further, he can inquire as to the name
and address of any person who was present, or claims to have been
present, at the scene of the accident. Since the defendant's insurance
company has conducted the investigation of the accident, it is ex-
tremely unlikely that the defendant will have this information. If
this is the case, he may technically answer that he cannot provide any
names or addresses, though the requested information is within the
knowledge of the non-party insurer. Obviously, permitting the in-
surer to be joined as a party-defendant, at least during discovery,
would rectify this inequitable situation. It may be argued that this
result can be achieved by liberally construing the party limitation of
Rule 33 to include the insurer within the definition of "party."
Many courts, however, have construed Rule 33 in a technical, literal
sense, thereby precluding the plaintiff from effectively using the in-
terrogatory as a discovery tool. For example, the court in Ju Shu
Cheung v. Dulles"S held that a next friend was not a party subject to
interrogation under Rule 33, and that the proper method to use was
the deposition upon written questions."' Similarly, where the Labor
Department brought a suit on behalf of two persons, they were not
considered parties, and the court therefore held that they could not
be required to answer interrogatories. 7
Fortunately, not all courts have assigned such a restrictive inter-
pretation to the word "party" in Rule 33. In a situation the con-
23 OHIO R. CIV. P. 33 provides that any party may serve any other party with written
interrogatories to be answered by the party served. Therefore, assuming the plaintiff
cannot join the defendant's insurer, he may serve interrogatories only on the defen-
dant. The matters which may be explored are subject to the scope of discovery set
forth in Rule 26(B).
2 4 Omo R. CIv. P. 26(B) (1). See 1 J. McCoRMAc, ANDERSON'S OHIO CIVL
PRACTIc E § 6.85, at 416 (1971).
25 16 F.R.D. 550, 552 (D. Mass. 1954).
2 6 LFED. R. CIv. P. 31. Ohio Rule 31, in pertinent part, is the same as its federal
counterpart. Rule 31 provides a poor substitute for discovery by means of interroga-
tories, however, due to the additional time and expense involved in the requirement
that an officer implement the Rule and administer the questions. See OHIO R. CIV. P.
31(B).
2 7 WirtZ v. I. C. Harris & Co., 36 F.R.D. 116 (E.D. Mich. 1964).
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verse of our hypothetical, a federal district court, noting that the
wrong was done to the assignor and that the plaintiff-insurer would
need the assignor's testimony to prove its claim anyway, held that
an insurer-assignee suing as a plaintiff was required to answer in-
terrogatories concerning the operation bf the assignor's company. 28
Since in subrogation cases the assignee-insurer rarely has personal
knowledge of the operative facts, the court felt that "[t]o allow
[the insurance company] to be insulated from answering these inter-
rogatories on the basis of lack of personal knowledge would not
be in accord with the objective of the Rules. ' 29
Thus it is arguable that even though Rule 33 is technically lim-
ited to parties, this fact should not preclude a plaintiff from obtain-
ing information otherwise discoverable and held by one in close rela-
tion to a party.30 Such an extension of the "party" requirement was
made in Wycoff v. Nichols31 where the plaintiff's interrogatory
sought only the personal knowledge of the defendant. The court
stated that had the question sought merely the "identity and location
of persons having knowledge of relevant facts" without reference
to the defendant's personal knowledge, all available information
would have to be supplied, including that possessed by the defen-
dant's attorney, investigators, insurer, or other agent or representa-
tive "whether personally known to the defendant or not. 3
2
Similarly, the court in Gaynor v. Atlantic Greyhound Corp.,33 ap-
proved an interrogatory calling for ". . . all the facts relating to the
alleged accident to the plaintiff, his injuries and his claim for dam-
ages, as to which you or your underwriters have obtained informa-
tion through witnesses, agents, or representatives. '3 4 This interrog-
atory was approved to facilitate pretrial discovery by eliminating
overly detailed questions which were burdensome to answer.
Very few cases have been reported in Ohio that deal with the
discovery procedures of the new Rules. One of particular signif-
icance is lira v. Erie-Lackawanna R.R., 5 which involved an auto
collision in which the plaintiff sought the names of witnesses which
28 Firemans Mut. Ins. Co. v. Erie-Lackawanna R.R., 35 F.R.D. 297 (N.D. Ohio
1964).
29 Id. at 299.
30 See Note, 1967 Proposed Amendments to the Federal Discovery Rules, 68
COLUM. L. REv. 271, 288 (1968).
31 32 F.R.D. 370 (W.D. Mo. 1963).
32 Id. at 371-72.
33 11 FED. RULES SERV. 26b.211 Case 6 at 554 (E.D. Pa. 1948).
34 Id. (emphasis added).
35 25 Ohio Misc. 161 (C.P. 1970).
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had been obtained by the defendant's representative. The court
approved a broad interpretation of the Rules and ordered the names
of the witness revealed, stating that "a party should not be forced
to take depositions of the witnesses and seek to obtain copies of
their statements by means of subpoenas duces tecum under Rule 45.
Such procedure would only serve to promote circuity of pre-trial
proceedings." 8
Therefore, a liberal interpretation of the party limitation of Rule
33 will ensure that the plaintiff can obtain the information he seeks
by permitting him to serve interrogatories on the defendant's lia-
bility insurer. However, conditioning the plaintiff's access to this
information via the use of interrogatories on the vagaries of judicial
acceptance of such a liberal interpretation has obvious shortcomings,
as evidenced by the numerous courts which have given Rule 33 a
narrow, technical reading. Clearly, permitting the joinder of the
insurer appears to be the preferable method of ensuring the plain-
tiff's access to information held by the insurer.
A similar, yet more complex problem is involved in our hypo-
thetical plaintiff's potential use of Rule 34 for the production of
documents and tangible things. Again, this Rule literally applies
only to parties, but it is further limited to documents or things
within "the possession, custody or control of the party."37 There-
fore, in addition to definitional difficulties concerning who is or
should be a "party," Rule 34 presents similar problems regarding the
meaning and scope of "possession," "custody," and "control.""8 In
Thomas v. Nuss39 the plaintiff moved for production of statements
made by prospective witnesses to the automobile accident involved,
which information was in the hands of the defendant's insurer. The
court of appeals affirmed the district court's denial of the request
on the grounds that Rule 34 is limited to actual parties to the pro-
ceeding and that the plaintiff had failed to show good cause. A
strict reading of Federal Rule 34 was also given by the court in
361d. at 168-69. See note 49 infra.
37 O0o R. Civ. P. 34(A).
38 1n addition, documents and tangible things sought to be obtained under Ohio
Rule 34 must be within the scope of discovery set forth in Rule 26(B). Therefore the
qualified work-product immunity provided to trial preparation materials by Rule 26
(B)(3) will be applicable to all requests for the discovery of such materials under Rule
34. This is also true under the current Federal Rule 34. Prior to the 1970 amend-
ments, however, Federal Rule 34 contained a good cause requirement, applicable to the
attempted discovery of all documents and tangible things, whether or not prepared in
anticipation of litigation or trial. This requirement is now contained in Federal Rule 26
(b) (3), and is applicable only to trial preparation materials. See note 18 supra.
39 353 F.2d 257 (6th Cir. 1965).
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Poppino v. Jones Store Co.,40 where the plaintiff sought certain
physicians' reports and statements obtained by an insurance com-
pany. The court stated that documents secured by the insurer need
not be produced since they were in the possession of the insurer's
attorney and there was no evidence that they were in the defen-
dant's custody. Similarly, in Bredice v. Doctors Hospital, Inc.,41 the
court protected reports given by a hospital to its malpractice insurer
after suit was filed.42 The court reasoned that such reports from the
insured to the insurer were going to be used by the insurer's attorney,
and, therefore, fell within the attorney's "work product." Thus the
work product rule was extended to cover material in the control of
the insurer. It would seem that if the insurer had originally been
joined as a party, the reports would have been available to the plain-
tiff under Rule 34.43
In a factual situation the converse of our hypothetical, the court
in Read v. Ulmer44 held that even though the insurer replaces the
insured to the extent of the policy limits in litigation under Louisi-
ana's direct action statute,45 the insurance company does not con-
trol and cannot be required to produce things held by its insured.
In Read, the defendant was the insurer, and the non-party control-
ling relevant information was the insured. The result, however,
was the same as in our hypothetical: information could not be se-
cured through Rule 34 from a non-party.
There is a parallel line of Rule 34 cases, however, which would
allow the plaintiff to obtain the information sought from the defen-
dant's insurer. For example, in Bingle v. Liggett Drug Co." a lit-
eral, mechanical interpretation of Federal Rule 34 was expressly re-
jected. Realizing that as a practical matter the insurer was the real
litigant, the court said: "To hold that statements obtained by [the
40 1 F.R.D. 215 (W.D. Mo. 1940).
41 50 F.R.D. 249 (D.D.C. 1970).
42 The court also refused to allow discovery under Federal Rule 34 of hospital staff
meeting reports, invoking the policy of protecting the public interest in allowing doctors
to self-criticize in privacy and thus attaching a qualified privilege to such reports. The
court also noted that the plaintiff had failed to demonstrate the existence of good cause
for the production of either set of reports.
43 Bredice was decided before the 1970 amendments to the Federal Rules became
effective. Today, under Federal Rule 26(b) (3), a qualified immunity might attach to
the reports in the insurer's possession if they were prepared in anticipation of trial.
See note 38 supra.
44 308 F.2d 915, 918 (5th Cir. 1962). See Security Mut. Cas. Co. v. Rich, 20
F.R.D. 112 (W.D. Pa. 1956).
45 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:655 (1962).
46 11 F.R.D. 593 (D. Mass. 1951).
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insurer] are immune from discovery would make possible the eva-
sion of Rule 34 on the many occasions on which a defendant's
case is actually prepared and controlled by a liability insurer."47
Similarly, in Simper v. Trimble,48 another automobile accident case,
the court, taking a liberal view of both the party and control limita-
tions, declared that the plaintiff's motion under Rule 34 would not
be denied even if the material sought were in the hands of the in-
surer. Since "[flor all practical purposes [the insurer] is ...an
actual party to the litigation... it should be subject to the ... rules
of procedure ... especially with respect to discovery. 49  And in
State Farm Insurance Co. v. Roberts,50 where the plaintiff sought
material within the possession of the defendant's insurer, the Su-
preme Court of Arizona held that for the purposes of discovery
under Arizona Rule 34, the insurance company stood in the position
of a party.51
The import of these cases which liberally construe the party and
control limitations of Rule 34 is that even though the insurer is not
joined, discovery of documents or tangible things is allowed, and
the plaintiff is able to obtain the information he needs to adequate-
ly prepare and conduct his case. 2 These cases again demonstrate
that a liberal judicial interpretation may aid the plaintiff and guar-
antee the realization of the rationale underlying discovery, while
at the same time shielding the defendant's insurer from being joined
as a party. However, the contrary decisions discussed earlier, which
narrowly construed Rule 34, demonstrate equally well the inade-
quacy of leaving to the courts the decision as to whether the plain-
tiff can obtain information from the defendant's insurer under Rule
471d. at 594.
489 F.R.D. 598 (W.D. Mo. 1949).
49 Id. at 600. Professor Moore, commenting on Simper v. Trimble and similar cases,
noted:
While these latter decisions stretch the concept of possession or control rather
far, from a practical point of view they are believed to be sound. The party
could obtain the documents by use of Rules 26 and 45 instead of Rule 34, but
this seems unnecessarily complicated in such a situation.
4A J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRAcTicE 34.17, at 34-100 n.9 (2d ed. 1972). See 107 U.
PA. L REV. 103, 105 (1958), which in discussing the meaning of "control" in Federal
Rule 34, concludes that "within the control" of a party has been defined as anything
which the party may legally obtain.
50 97 Ariz. 169, 177, 398 P.2d 671, 676 (1965).
51 See Gottlieb v. Bresler, 24 F.R.D. 371 (D.D.C. 1959); Martin v. N. V. Neder-
landsche-Amerikansche St. M., 8 F.R.D. 363 (S.D.N.Y. 1948); Rockett v. John J.
Casale Inc., 7 F.R.D. 575 (S.D.N.Y. 1947).
52A liberal interpretation of the party and control requirements of Rule 34 will al-
low discovery only so long as the materials sought are within the scope of discovery set
forth in Rule 26(B)(3). See note 38 supra.
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34. Only by permitting the insurer to be joined, at least for the
purposes of discovery, can the plaintiff be assured full discovery.
It may be argued, however, that the plaintiff has alternative
means by which to obtain the information he seeks from the defen-
dant's insurer since not all discovery devices are limited to parties.
He may proceed by taking the deposition of the non-party insurer
under Rule 30 3 compelling the insurer's attendance by means of a
subpoena if necessary.54 The plaintiff may also subpoena tangible
evidence to be presented at the deposition.55 Or, alternatively he
may take testimony by means of a deposition upon written questions
under Rule 31.56 These Rules are not limited to parties and may be
used to acquire information from the non-party insurer. The exclu-
sive use of these Rules, however, rather than the use of Rules 33
and 34, entails certain limitations and drawbacks for the injured
plaintiff.
First of all, the use of non-party methods may prove more time-
consuming and costly than the use of Rules 33 and 34.n7 For ex-
ample, if the plaintiff desires to obtain documentary evidence, he
must use a subpoena duces tecum under the non-party discovery
Rules, whereas if the insurer were a party or were treated as one, an
extra-judicial request under Rule 34 would preclude the unnecessary
expense and procedure involved in using a subpoena.5 8  The cost
of an attorney's time and a transcript and the additional use of a
subpoena necessitated by the use of Rules 30 and 45 is a circuitous
and expensive route to information readily obtainable if the insurer
were a party."9 Therefore, assuming the plaintiff's needs may be
satisfied by the use of Rule 34, preventing him from using it to
obtain information from the defendant's insurer results in placing
an increased burden on his attempted discovery. Secondly, the ef-
fectiveness of Rule 31 (applicable to parties and non-parties) is
questionable. A relatively recent survey has shown that depositions
530mo R. Civ. P. 30.
54 Id. 45(A).
55 Id. 45 (B).
56Id. 31.
57See note 26 supra. Although it is more expensive, the use of an oral deposition
(Rule 30) may be preferable to the use of written interrogatories (Rule 33) because it
forces the deponent to answer spontaneously. Answers to interrogatories are normally
prepared by the attorney representing the party served.
58 OHio R. CIV. P. 30(B)(4) provides that "t]he notice to a party deponent may be
accompanied by a request made in compliance with Rule 34 for the production of docu-
ments and tangible things at the taking of the deposition" (emphasis added).
59 See note 49 supra.
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upon written questions are used in only about 2 percent of all civil
cases.6" Again, an officer or notary expense will be incurred, and
Rule 31 also prevents the plaintiff from acquiring spontaneous and
unrehearsed answers to his questions.
The foregoing analysis of the relation of the discovery Rules to
insurance litigation has noted that some courts may be disposed to
apply the party Rules strictly. Sufficient authority exists, however,
in lira v. Erie-Lackawanna R.R.61 and similar cases for the Ohio
courts to avoid so technical a reading of these Rules. While this
would moot the distinction between the party and non-party Rules,
thereby permitting the plaintiff access to the defendant's insurer
under any and all of the discovery Rules, there is no assurance that
Ohio courts will follow this reasoning. For, as was noted by the
Federal Advisory Committee, "While an ideal solution to this prob-
lem is to provide for discovery against persons not parties in Rule
34, both the jurisdictional and procedural problems are very com-
plex."6 2  By allowing the plaintiff to join the insurer as a party-
defendant, at least for pleading and discovery purposes, judicial dis-
cretion would be minimized and complete discovery maximized. By
recognizing that, in reality, the insurer is a party,63 pretrial discovery
and procedure would be facilitated and unnecessary duplication of
lawsuits would be avoided. A broad reading of Ohio Rules 18(B)
and 20(A) may permit such a procedure. However, traditionally
there has been slim legal support for such joinder both in Ohio and
other jurisdictions.
III. GENERAL ARGUMENTS CONCERNING JOINDER
OF OR DIRECT ACTION AGAINST AN INSURER64
Since privity of contract generally does not exist between an in-
jured plaintiff and the defendant's liability insurer, joinder of the in-
60 COLUMBIA UNPIERSITY PROJEcT FOR EFFECTIVE JUSTICE, FIELD STUDY OF PRE-
TRIAL DIscOvERY VII-4 (1965).
6125 Ohio Misc. 161 (C.P. 1970). See text accompanying notes 35-36 supra.
6 2 Federal Advisory Comm. Note to Rule 34(c), 48 F.R.D. at 487 (1967).
63 See note 74 infra.
6 4 For an extensive discussion of the general problems involved when direct action
against or joinder of an insurance company is attempted see 8 J. APPLEmAN, INSURANCE
LAW AND PRACTICE § 4851 (1962); Lassiter, Direct Actions Against the Insurer, 1949
INS. LJ. 411 (1949); MacDonald, Direct Action Against Liability Insurance Companies,
1957 Wis. L. REv. 612 (1957); Comment, Direct Actions, supra note 11; Note, Di-
rect Action Against the Liability Insurer: A Legislative Approach for Florida, 23 U.
FLA. L REV. 304 (1971); Note, Binding the Insurer, 27 WASa & LEE L REv. 93
(1970).
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surer as a party has not been permitted." The traditional argument
against joinder has been that a liability insurance agreement is a
private contract to protect and benefit the insured. This interpreta-
tion of the insurance contract has limited the plaintiff to an action
originally only against the tortfeasor. Also, the fault concept of
automobile litigation, present in most states, has limited the plain-
tiff's action to one solely against the tortfeasor. 66 Since the insur-
ance company has committed no tort and is interested only finan-
cially in the outcome of the case, traditional procedure has not
permitted joinder.
Not all states, however, have limited themselves to these inter-
pretations. Some states by statute have permitted a direct action
against the defendant's insurer.67  The purpose of such statutes is
to allow the injured party to directly sue the insurer in order to be
compensated for his damages. 68  Other states have judicially recog-
nized the right of the injured party to proceed directly against the
insurer.69 The vast majority of states, however, do not permit di-
rect actions, and still adhere to traditional arguments against permit-
ting the plaintiff to initially bring the insurer into the case under any
circumstances.70
Perhaps the most comprehensive case negating many of the tradi-
tional reasons offered for disallowing joinder is the Florida Supreme
Court decision in Shingleton v. Bussey.7" In allowing joinder,
Shingleton rejected the private theory of automobile insurance as
65 Kowalski v. Holden, 276 F.2d 359 (6th Cir. 1960); Mertes v. Cent. Security
Mut. Ins. Co., 103 Ill. App. 2d, 171, 242 N.E.2d 905 (196&); Sterns v. Graves, 61 Idaho
232, 242, 99 P.2d 955, 958 (1940).
66 No-fault insurance plans, currently being adopted by several states, reject the fault
concept, and, therefore, nullify the validity of this argument against joinder. See note
95 infra.
67 E.g., WIS. STAT. ANN. § 260.11(1) (Supp. 1969); LA, REV. STAT. ANN. §
22:655 (1962).
68 A direct action against the insurer is slightly different from joinder, where both the
alleged tortfeasor and his insurer are named as parties-defendant. Under a direct action
statute, the plaintiff may proceed directly against the defendant's insurer, there may be
no need to join the insured as a party.
69 Shingleton v. Bussey, 223 So. 2d 713 (Fla. 1969); James v. Young, 77 N.D. 451,
42 N.W.2d 692 (1950); Lopez v. Townsend, 37 N.M. 574, 25 P.2d 809 (1933). Cf.
Breeden v. Wilson, 58 N.M. 517, 273 P.2d 376 (1954), in which the court did not
overtly condone a direct action against the insurer but construed a city ordinance that
required taxis to carry a surety bond or insurance policy as allowing a direct action by an
injured party.
70 There are signs, however, that the traditional role of the liability insurer is being
questioned. The primary example of this new view is the current interest in no-fault
insurance as an alternative to the present fault-based system. See note 95 infra.
71223 So. 2d 713 (Fla. 1969). See Note, Direct Action Against the Liability Insurer,
supra note 64, at 316.
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inconsistent with public policy, and advanced several reasons for
overturning the non-joinder approach the Florida courts had pre-
viously taken.72  Primarily, the majority viewed the injured plaintiff
as a third-party beneficiary to the contract between the insured and
insurer.73 Secondly, the court reasoned that because the insurance
company hires the attorney, conducts the investigation, and controls
the course of possible litigation, it is the real party in interest.7
The Shingleton court also addressed itself to one of the most
persistent bars to the joinder of insurance companies, the "no-action"
clause.75 Hurdling this clause has been a constant problem facing
the injured plaintiff. The effect of a "no-action" clause is to pre-
clude any direct action against the insurer, or any joinder of the
insurer as a party, until the insured's liability has been determined.
No action may be taken to collect a judgment from the insurer un-
til after the insured's liability is first established. Most jurisdictions
have repeatedly recognized and affirmed the validity of the "no-
72 223 So. 2d at 713. The court explicitly overruled Artille v. Davidson, 126 Fla.
219, 170 So. 707 (1936).
73 223 So. 2d at 715.
74Id. at 718. See remarks of Marvin Harrison, supra note 1:
What part does the insurance company play?
It investigates the accident.
It talks with the witnesses.
It hires the experts.
It employs the lawyer.
It controls the preparation of the pleadings.
It determines the strategy of the trial and decides whether there shall be at-
tempts at continuance - or attempts for immediate trial.
It pays the costs of the trial.
It controls the taking of depositions before trial.
It controls all negotiations for settlement, and (subject to its policy limits) pays
the amount of any settlement or judgment.
It determines whether or not adverse judgments should be appealed.
Anybody who does all of those things may perhaps be baptized with many
different names. But there is one thing that is sure - no matter what else
you may call him - he is in fact the real defendant. And if the law pretends
that he is not, then the law, in the picturesque but forcible language of Mr.
Bumble, is certainly an ass.
Id. at 78 (emphasis added).
75 A standard "no-action" clause would read as follows:
No action shall lie against the company unless, as a condition precedent there-
to, the Insured shall have fully complied with all the terms of this policy, nor
until the amount of the Insured's obligation to pay shall have been finally
determined either by judgment against the insured after actual trial or by writ-
ten agreement....
No person or organization shall have any right under this policy to join the
Company as a party to any action against the Insured to determine the In-
sured's liability, nor shall the Company be impleaded by the Insured or his
legal representative.
See Comment, Direct Actions, supra note 11, at 540-42.
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action" clause.76 Shingleton disposed of this barrier on policy
grounds, stating that:
It is unrealistic that mass liability insurance coverage designed to
afford protective benefits for the general public should contain such
a condition precedent, [the "no-action" clause], as a barrier to the
right of identified members of the protected class to pursue a
speedy, realistic and adequate recovery action.77
The "no-action" clause has also been invalidated by some courts
when faced with an impleader situation, which arises in cases where
the insurer either disclaims coverage and refuses to defend the in-
sured or insists it has no duty to defend under specific policy provi-
sions. Although the insured may then implead his insurer under
Rule 14,78 the insurer can invoke the "no-action" clause to escape
from being impleaded. Some courts have refused, however, to per-
mit the use of the "no-action" clause to nullify the insured's right to
utilize Rule 14.
[The no-action clause] poses a question as to whether the court
should permit litigants to circumvent rules of court by contractual
arrangements. Rule 14 was promulgated not only for the purpose
of serving litigants but as a wise exposition of public policy. The
object of the rule was to facilitate litigation, to save costs, to bring
all of the litigants into one proceeding, and to dispose of an en-
tire matter without the expense and the labor of many suits and
many trials. The no-action provision of the policy is neither help-
ful to the third-party defendant, to the courts, nor generally is it in
the interest of the public welfare. Its object is to put weights on
the already too slow feet of justice.80
Since "no-action" clauses may be negated in the impleader situ-
ation, it is arguable that an injured party should also be able to
7 6 Sumait v. Capital Fire & Cas. Co., 296 F.2d 108 (9th Cir. 1961); Joyce v. Central
Sur. & Ins. Corp., 321 S.W.2d 272 (Mo. App. 1959); Crowley v. Hardman, 223 P.2d
1045 (Colo. 1950); Degnan v. Rhode Island Mut. Liability Ins. Co., 51 R.I. 366,
154 A. 912 (1931); Smith Storage Co. v. Eckert, 21 Ariz. 28, 184 P. 1001 (1919).
77223 So. 2d at 717. See Oertel v. Williams, 251 N.W. 465 (Wis. 1933).
78 OHio R. Civ. P. 14 and FED. R. Civ. P. 14, in pertinent part, are identical. Im-
pleading the insurer does not place it in the position of a joint tortfeasor, but merely
joins the insurer as one who may be responsible for all or part of any judgment ren-
dered. See 6 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 16, § 1449, at 267; DeParcq &
Wright, Impleader of Defendant's Insurer Under Modern Pleading Rules, 38 MINN.
L. REV. 229 (1954); Wright, Joinder of Claims and Parties Under Modern Pleading
Rules, 36 MINN. L. REv. 580, 615-17 (1952).
79 Government Employees Ins. Co. v. United States, 400 F.2d 172 (10th Cir. 1968);
Green v. Shepherd Constr. Co., 46 F.R.D. 434 (D. Ga. 1969); Pioneer Mut. Compensa-
tion Co. v. Cosby, 125 Colo. 468, 244 P.2d 1089 (1952); Hipp v. Kansas City Pub.
Serv. Co., 237 S.W.2d 928 (Mo. Ct. App. 1951).
80Jordan v. Stephens, 7 F.R.D. 140, 142 (W.D. Mo. 1945). See Comment, Di-
rect Actions, supra note 11, at 542.
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circumvent such clauses in the joinder situation, especially in light
of the policy arguments used in Shingleton. In both the impleader8"
and joinder82 situations, the insurer is brought into the suit not as a
tortfeasor but as a party whose liability is contingent. Therefore,
the rationale for permitting the insurer to be impleaded in the face
of a "no-action" clause would appear to apply equally to joinder.
Another traditional argument for non-joinder has been that the
insurance company will be unduly prejudiced if the jury is aware
that the defendant is insured.8 This fear is certainly not-ground-
less, given the fact that it is arguably much easier for the jury to
render a higher verdict for a plaintiff if they feel the "deep pocket"
of a large insurance company will be footing the bill. In most
trials even the slightest mention of insurance coverage is prohib-
ited.'-
Although definitive empirical evidence concerning the thought
processes of jurors is scanty, the University of Chicago Jury Project
is of particular significance."5 The study found that the lowest jury
awards were against uninsured defendants. Awards were higher
when the jury learned that the defendant was insured and highest
when defense counsel objected to the mention of such insurance.86
Although this study indicates that the presence of insurance affects
the size of money judgments, the results should not be taken as de-
finitive.8 7 Professor Kalven, the project's director, indicated that
knowledge of the existence of insurance may influence the outcome
only when the jury is in serious doubt. Evidently the jurors would
rather resolve their doubts against insurance companies than risk
81 See note 78 supra.
8 2 See notes 118-19 infra & accompanying text.
8 3 Jennings v. Beach, 1 F.R.D. 442 (D. Mass. 1940). Contra United States v. Cisco
Aircraft, Inc., 54 F.R.D. 181 (D. Mont. 1972). See generally C. MCCORMAcrK, EVI-
DENCE § 168 (1954); Comment, Direct Actions, supra note 11, at 535-40.
84 8 J. APPLEMAN, supra note 64, at § 4861. See Comment, Direct Actions, supra
note 11, at 537 & n.75.
85 Broeder, The University of Chicago Jury Project, 38 NEB. L. REV. 744 (1959).
This study employed experimental juries who heard tape recordings of mock trials that
were based upon actual trials. The case presented to the jury involved an auto accident
in which the plaintiff, a 40-year-old stenographer, was injured when the car in which
she was riding as a passenger collided with a car driven by the defendant.8 8When the defendant revealed that he had no insurance, the average jury award
was $33,000. The jury's award rose to $37,000 when the fact that the defendant was
insured was revealed to the jury without defense objections. The highest awards, aver-
aging $46,000, occurred when the judge sustained defense objections to the revelation
of the fact that the defendant was insured and instructed the jury to disregard this fact.
Id. at 754.
87 Kalven, The Jury, the Law, and the Personal Injury Damage Award, 19 OHIO ST.
L.J. 158, 171-72 (1958). See Comment, Direct Actions, supra note 11, at 539.
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error against the injured plaintiff.88  Although the study adds cre-
dence to the "deep pocket" objection against joinder, several factors
weigh against continued acceptance of this rationale.
First, it may be incorrect to assume that juries now do not con-
sider, or are ignorant of, the presence of insurance.89 The Shingle-
ton court dealt with this problem by noting that the modern jury is
sophisticated enough to render an honest judgment and that disclo-
sure of the existence of insurance promotes intellectual honesty."
Secondly, there is no evidence that the verdicts in the direct-action
states are significantly higher than in non-joinder states.91 Thirdly,
practically speaking, the existence of insurance may be indirectly
interjected at trial by suggestive voir dire when impaneling the
jury,"  or, in certain instances, during the trial itself.93  Fourth,
there is no reason to assume that the jury will treat an insurance
company any differently than any large corporation which is a de-
fendant in a lawsuit. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the
insurer need not be prejudiced at all since the court may order sep-
arate trials under Federal Rules 20(b) and 42(b) or their state en-
acted equivalent.94
One strong argument against joinder remains: that the pur-
pose and function of the trial is to determine fault and liability,
not the ability to pay. Since the vast majority of jurisdictions
still adhere to the fault concept for automobile accident litigation, 5
it may be argued that it is impossible to justify making the insur-
8 8 Kalven, supra note 87, at 171-72.
89 Id.
90 Shingleton v. Bussey, 223 So. 2d 713, 718 (Fla. 1969).
91 See Comment, Direct Actions, supra note 11, at 539-40.
92 It has been held permissible for a plaintiff's attorney to ask prospective jurors, in
good faith, whether they are interested in a particular insurance company or in any in-
surance company. See Mayer v. Sampson, 402 P.2d 185 (Colo. 1965); Brown v. Parker,
375 S.W.2d 594 (Mo. Ct. App. 1964); Swift v. Winkler, 307 P.2d 666 (Cal. Ct. App.
1957). See generally Kabb, Insurance Questions in Voir Dire, 17 CLEV.-MA. L. REV.
504 (1968).
9o See Comment, Direct Actions, supra note 11, at 536-38.
94 United States v. Cisco Aircraft, Inc., 54 F.R.D. 181, 182 (D. Mont. 1972).
95 It is not within the scope of this Note to examine the related controversy sur-
rounding "no-fault" insurance. Suffice it to say that the adoption of some form of no-
fault insurance would undoubtedly reduce the volume of cases in which joinder would
be at issue, but since several of the no-fault plans have some dollar limit or option to sue
for other damages, the issue of direct action or joinder would not be completely mooted.
See Ghiardi & Kircher, Automobile Insurance Reparations Plans: An Analysis of
Eight Existing Laws, 55 MARQ. L. REV. 1, 3-4 (1972). See generally W. ROKES, NO-
FAULT INSURANCE (1971); Symposium on No, Fault Automobile Insurance - Per-
spectives on the Problems and the Plans, 21 CATHOLIC U. L REV. 259 (1972); Com-
ment, No-FaultInusrance, 39TENN. L. REV. 132 (1971).
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ance company a party when their fault, or lack thereof, is not at
issue. In light of the impleader situation, however, where the in-
surer may be brought into the case notwithstanding the fault concept,
the validity of this argument appears to be greatly diminished."
In any event, it is possible to remain true to the fault concept, while
at the same time providing the plaintiff with the benefits of joinder
- the opportunity to obtain all the information necessary for the
preparation of his case in a non-burdensome manner - by permit-
ting the defendant's insurer to be joined solely for the purposes of
discovery. Moreover, since under Rule 18(B) relief can only be
granted in accordance with the "relative substantive rights of the
parties," permitting the insurer to be joined will have no adverse
effects upon its rights. 7
IV. JOINDER IN OHIO
A. Prior to the New Rules of Civil Procedure
As a general rule Ohio courts have consistently adhered to all
of the traditional arguments against allowing joinder of insurance
companies." Actions involving liability insurers have been regu-
lated by O.R.C. section 3929.06,99 which provides that when a plain-
tiff obtains a judgment against an insured defendant, he has a right
to have the insurance proceeds applied in satisfaction thereof. If
the judgment is not satisfied within 30 days, the statute grants the
plaintiff a direct cause of action against the insurer. In other words,
9 6 See notes 78-82 supra & accompanying text.
9 7 See notes 118-119 infra & accompanying text.
98 See notes 64-95 supra & accompanying text.
99 OIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3929.06 (Page 1971) provides:
Upon the recovery of a final judgment against any firm, person, or corpora-
don by any person, including administrators and executors, for loss or damage
on account of bodily injury or death, for loss or damage to tangible or in-
tangible property of any person, firm, or corporation, for loss or damage on
account of loss or damage to tangible or intangible property of any person,
firm, or corporation, or for loss or damage to a person on account of bodily
injury to his wife or minor child or children, if the defendant in such action
was insured against loss or damage at the time when the rights of action arose,
the judgment creditor or his successor in interest is entitled to h~ave the insur-
ance money provided for in the contract of insurance between the insurance
company and the defendant applied to the satisfaction of the judgment. If
the judgment is not satisfied within thirty days after it is rendered, the judgment
creditor or his successor in interest, to reach and apply the insurance money
to the satisfaction of the judgment, may file a supplemental petition in the ac-
tion in which said judgment was rendered, in which the insurer is made new
party defendant in said action, and whereon service of summons upon the in-
surer shall be made and returned as in the commencement of an action at law.
Thereafter the action shall proceed as to the insurer as in an original action.
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section 3929.06, in effect, operates as a codified "no-action" clause.
It precludes the injured party from initiating any action against the
insurer until a final determination of his claim against the insured
is rendered.
The significance of the statute was evidenced in Celina Mutual
Insurance Co. v. Sadler,1°' where the court in a declaratory judg-
ment action stated that in the absence of provisions in the policy
or an intention shown to the contrary, the provisions of this statute
are to be considered a part of the lex loci contractus governing the
insurance contract.' This holding indicated that the statute will
govern any attempted action by an injured party who desires to pro-
ceed against the defendant's insurer prior to obtaining judgment
against the insured. Thus the statute, its interpretation, and the
"no-action" clause have had the identical result of precluding any
action in Ohio against the insurer until the insured's obligation to
pay has been finally adjudicated.
Prior to the enactment of the new Rules, an equally important
impediment to the joinder of an insurance company in Ohio was
O.R.C. section 2309.05,102 which governed the joinder of causes of
action. While the statute permitted the joining of legal and equi-
table claims against a party,"0 3 there was no indication that joinder
of an insured and his insurer was permitted.0 4 This pleading
statute, read in conjunction with the statute governing procedure
against insurance companies, 10 5 effectively prohibited any joinder or
direct action against the insurer.
In addition to these statutes, the Ohio case law also seems to
have precluded any possibility of joinder prior to the new Rules
The arguments successfully advanced in Shingleton v. Bussey'06
have not been favorably received by Ohio courts. The court in
State Auto Mutual Insurance Co. v. Columbus Motor Express.'.
specifically declared that a liability insurance policy should not be
construed as being for the benefit of a third person, and stated
100 6 Ohio App. 2d 161,217 N.E.2d 255 (1966).
101 Id. at 166, 217 NE.2d at 258. The holding of Celina was heavily criticized in
St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. State, 25 Ohio Misc. 26 (C.P. 1970).
10 2 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2309.05 (Page 1963). This statute was replaced by
OHIO R. CIv. P. 18.
10 3 Bingham v. Nypano R.R., 112 Ohio St. 115, 147 N.E. 1 (1925). See Comment,
Joinder of Causes of Action in Ohio, 1 TOLEDO L. REV. 406 (1969).
104 See 1 S. JACOBY, supra note 7, at 167.
105 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3929.06 (Page 1971).
106 223 So. 2d 713 (Fla. 1969). See notes 71-77 supra & accompanying text.
107 15 Ohio L. Abs. 747 (Ct. App. 1933).
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that it was not intended to give the injured party a right of action
against the insurer. In Ohio, the insurer's liability existed only if
the claim against the tortfeasor had been reduced to a final judg-
ment. Although Ohio courts have recognized that the injured party
has a "substantial right or interest" in the contract,1 8 they have
been unwilling to allow a direct action to enforce the right. Simi-
larly Ohio evidentiary law also conforms to the majority of jurisdic-
tions in not allowing the fact of insurance coverage to be men-
tioned at trial.1°9 However, proper voir dire questions which sug-
gest the defendant is insured have been permitted. 110
B. joinder in Ohio Subsequent to the New Rules"'
As discussed previously, the principal bar to the joinder of a li-
ability insurer as a party-defendant in Ohio has been section 3929.06,
O.R.C. However, the enactment of the new Rules, especially the
broad language of Rule 18(B), coupled with Rule 20(A), may
provide the means for allowing such joinder.
Article IV, section 5 (B) of the Ohio Constitution provides that
the "Supreme Court shall prescribe rules governing practice and
procedure in all courts of the state, which rules shall not abridge,
enlarge, or modify any substantive right. . . . All laws in conflict
with such rules shall be of no further force or effect after such rules
have taken effect.""' 2 Therefore, if Rule 18(B) is a valid exercise
of the Court's rule-making power, that is, if it does not affect any
substantive right, and if section 3929.06 conflicts with it, the courts
108 Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co. v. Randall, 125 Ohio St. 581, 585-86, 183 N.E. 433,
435 (1932); Evans v. Grange Mut. Cas. Co., 12 Ohio Misc. 108, 230 N.E.2d 751 (C.P.
1964).
109 Frank v. Corcoran, 25 Ohio App. 356, 158 N.E. 501 (1926).
11o Krupp v. Poor, 24 Ohio St. 2d 123, 265 N.E.2d 268 (1970); Black v. Port, Inc.,
202 N.E.2d 638 (Ohio Cr. App. 1963); Fout v. Holland, 7 Ohio Op. 2d 21, 145 N.E.2d
476 (1956).
111 One ancillary problem to joining the insurer as a party which should be men-
tioned concerns service of process. The focus of this Note is on the Ohio Civil Rules and
Ohio practice. To a certain degree such a discussion presupposes available service both
on the tortfeasor-defendant and his insurer, if the insurer is to be joined as a party. An
our-of-state insurer who maintains a policy covering an Ohio resident would be ame-
nable to proper service under the "minimum contacts" theory of International Shoe Co.
v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). If, however, both the alleged tortfeasor and his
insurer are fom out of state, the plaintiff may be unable to perfect service upon the in-
surer - the requisite minimum contact would be nonexistent Perhaps the minimum
contacts theory could be extended by arguing that if the insurer by contract is bound to
defend the insured in Ohio then sufficient contact with the state has been established.
For a more detailed examination of this particular problem see Note, Direct Action
Against Liability Insurer, supra note 64, at 322-25.
112 Omo CONST. art IV, § 5(B) (emphasis added).
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have the authority and the responsibility to judicially disregard sec-
tion 3929.06 and to allow the plaintiff to join his contingent claim
against the insurer with his claim against the insured.113  And if he
can join these claims, the plaintiff can utilize Rule 20(A) to join
the insurer as a party.
There is no doubt that the literal language of 18(B), "When-
ever a claim is one heretofore cognizable only after another claim
has been prosecuted to a conclusion, the two claims may be joined
in a single action," encompasses the two-step procedure set forth in
section 3929.06. Since the statute, therefore, conflicts with the Rule,
the Rule, if valid in the joinder situation, will supersede it and be
applicable. The relevant inquiry is whether allowing joinder under
Rule 18(B) is substantive or procedural, which boils down to
whether it will infringe any substantive right of the insurer.
The Ohio courts have not dealt directly with the issue of whether
joinder of a particular party is substantive or procedural in nature.
Attempts to define these nebulous and overlapping terms have oc-
curred in situations where joinder was not involved. The Ohio
Supreme Court applied a standard definition when it stated that
"It is doubtful if a perfect definition of 'substantive law' or 'proce-
dural or remedial law' could be devised. However, the authorities
agree that, in general terms, substantive law is that which creates
duties, rights, and obligations, while procedural or remedial law
prescribes methods of enforcement of rights or obtaining re-
dress.""' 4  Under such a definition, joinder under Rule 18(B), in
the abstract, is clearly procedural rather than substantive;" 5 it cov-
ers the "who" and "how" of a lawsuit rather than the "what.""' 6
This provides no indication, however, of whether permitting the
insurer to be joined will affect its substantive rights.
It can be argued that absent Rule 18(B) the plaintiff would be
unable to join the insurer, and that, therefore, permitting joinder
would negate the insurer's right not to be joined. In reality, how-
113 Although section 3929.06 was not expressly repealed or modified by the enact-
ment of the new Rules, the General Assembly has declared that its "failure to repeal or
amend any.. . section establishes no evidence concerning its conflict with [the) rules."
H. 1201 § 1 (June 11, 1970). See OHio RULES OF COURT 1972 at vii (West 1972).
114 State ex rel. Holdridge v. Indus. Comm'n, 11 Ohio St. 2d 175, 178, 228 N.E.2d
621, 623 (1967). See Bagsarian v. Parker Metal Co., 282 F. Supp. 766, 769-70 (N.D.
Ohio 1968); In re McCombs Estate, 52 Ohio L. Abs. 353, 375, 80 N.E.2d 573, 586
(P. Ct. 1948).
115See Huntress v. Estate of Huntress, 235 F.2d 205, 208 (7th Cir. 1956).
116 See Joiner & Miller, Rules of Practice and Procedure: A Study of Judicial Rule
Making, 55 MIcH. L REv. 623,648 (1957).
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ever, the insurer has no such right.117  Furthermore, whatever rights
the insurer has will not be affected by allowing joinder under Rule
18(B), for it expressly provides that, "the court shall grant relief
...only in accordance with the relative substantive rights of the
parties.'"11 8  Joining the insurer would, therefore, not affect the sub-
stantive liability of the insurer, since it would still not be liable to
the plaintiff unless and until he first obtained a judgment against
the insured."' Moreover, the analogy to the permissibity of joinder
in the impleader situation 2° provides yet another indication that
the insurer does not have a substantive right not to be joined, espe-
cially since its liability under Rule 18(B) will remain contingent
upon a judgment being rendered against the insured.12
In Shingleton v. Bussey,122 the Florida Supreme Court was faced
with the question of whether a court can utilize a Rule of Civil
Procedure to permit a personal injury plaintiff to initially assert his
claim against the defendant's insurer. By relying on its rulemaking
power 123 and fashioning a direct action out of Florida Rule
1.210(a) ,124 the court recognized, at least implicitly, 25 that the in-
surer had no substantive right not to be sued prior to the determi-
nation of the insured's liability. Although Shingleton involved a
direct action rather than joinder, and a Rule different from Ohio
Rule 18(B), it is clear that, at least by analogy, the application of
117 See 6 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 16, § 1594, at 833-34.
118 Omo R. Civ. P. 18(B) (emphasis added).
119 See Miller's Natel Ins. Co. v. Wichita Flour Mills Co., 257 F.2d 93, 104 (10th
Cit. 1958); Comment, Direct Actions, supra note 11, at 527 n.14 , 541-42.
120 See notes 78-82 supra & accompanying text.
121 See 6 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 16, § 1594, at 833-34.
122 223 So. 2d 713 (Fla. 1969).
123 The Florida Supreme Court's rulemaking power, contained in article 5, section
3 of the Florida Constitution, has been construed as being subject to the limitation that
Rules may neither abridge, enlarge, nor modify any substantive rights. State v. Furen,
118 So. 2d 6, 12 (Fla. 1960).
124 FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.210(a) provides:
Every action may be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest...
All persons having an interest in the subject of the action and in obtaining the
relief demanded may join as plaintiffs and any person may be made a defendant
who has or claims an interest adverse to the plaintiff. Any person may at any
time be made a party if his presence is necessary or proper to a complete deter-
mination of the cause. Persons having a united interest may be joined on
the same side as plaintiffs or defendants, and when any one refuses to join, he
may for such reason be made a defendant.
125 The issue of whether the insurance company had a substantive right not to be
sued directly was most clearly articulated by the Shingleton dissent. 223 So. 2d at 721-
22.
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Rule 18(B) to the contingent insured-insurer situation is mandated
under article IV, section 5(B) of the Ohio Constitution.
While recognizing that joinder of parties is essentially proce-
dural in nature, however, many courts, determining that the insur-
ance company has a substantive right not to be joined, have not per-
mitted joinder under Federal Rule 18(b) or its state-enacted
equivalent.'26  While the specific reasons relied on by these deci-
sions have varied, it is clear that plaintiffs have had little success
in attempting to join insurance companies.
The most significant case in Ohio denying joinder is Pennsyl-
vania R.R. v. Lattavo Brothers, Inc.,"' in which a federal dis-
trict court specifically held that joinder of an insurer was not per-
mitted under Federal Rules 18(b) and 20(a). Several reasons were
offered to sustain the court's holding. The court first observed that
the questions of law and fact in the case were related to the colli-
sion, not to the insurance contract between the defendant and his
insurer. It was noted that, therefore, the plaintiff only had a cause
of action against the insurer after judgment was decided in his fa-
vor. Finally, the court found no statute in Ohio which permitted
such joinder of the liability insurer. 2 '
Joinder was similarly attempted in Jennings v. Beach,'29 where
the plaintiffs' attempted use of the broad language of Federal
Rule 18(b) was also rejected by the court. However, the reason
for such rejection was slightly different than that offered in Lattavo.
While the court recognized that the question of the joinder of an
insurance company was primarily procedural, it did not permit such
joinder on the ground that a jury would be unduly prejudiced
knowing the verdict would be paid by an insurance company. 130
12 6 Headrick v. Smokey Mountain Stages, Inc., 11 F.R.D. 205 (E.D. Tenn. 1950);
Pennsylvania R.R. v. Lattavo Bros., Inc., 9 F.R.D. 205 (N.D. Ohio 1949); Jennings
v. Beach, 1 F.R.D. 422 (D. Mass. 1940); Pitcairn v. Rumsey, 32 F. Supp. 146 (W.D.
Mich. 1940); Hertz v. Hudson Motor Car Co., 8 F.R.D. 431 (D.D.C. 1939); Crowley
v. Hardman Bros., 223 P.2d 1045 (Colo. 1950). See Grier v. Tri-State Transit Co.,
36 F. Supp. 26 (W.D. La. 1940), aff'd, 127 F.2d 719 (5th Cir. 1942). Contra, United
States v. Cisco Aircraft, Inc., 54 F.R.D. 181 (D. Mont. 1972); Shingleton v. Bussey,
223 So. 2d 713 (Fla. 1969). See Hickey v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 239 F. Supp. 109 (E.D-
Tenn. 1965).
1279 F.R.D. 205 (N.D. Ohio 1949). The action arose from a collision between de-
fendant's truck and one of plaintiff's trains. Plaintiff joined defendant's insurer under
Federal Rules 18(b) and 20(a) and the defendants moved to have the insurer dis-
missed as a party.
128 Id. at 206. Lattavo was cited by the Ohio Rules Advisory Comm. Staff Notes
to Rule 18(B) as precluding the joinder of liability insurers under that Rule. See note
9 supra.
129 1 F.R.D. 442 (D. Mass. 1940).
130 Id. at 442.
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Recently, however, such reasoning was rejected, and joinder per-
mitted, in United States v. Cisco Aircraft, Inc., 1' where the fed-
eral government was suing a governmental contractor and its insurer
for damages allegedly caused by the contractor. While recognizing
that Montana substantive law provided that the insurer's liability
was contingent and that, therefore, it was not yet liable to the gov-
ernment, the court stated that
Whether a complaint in a federal court states a daim is a matter of
federal law and it is dear as a matter of federal procedure that a
complaint may state a claim against a defendant before that de-
fendant's contingent liability has become absolute....
The result reached is contrary to Pitcairn v. Rumsey, 32 F. Supp.
146 (W.D. Mich. 1940), and Jennings v. Beach, 1 F.R.D. 442 (D.
Mass. 1940), but I believe it to be compelled by the language of
Rule 18(b). The fears expressed in those opinions are more imag-
inary than real since under Rule 18(b) the court may grant relief
only in accordance with the substantive rights and under Rule 20(b)
and 42 (b) the court can, where there is a state policy to that effect,
prevent disclosure of the existence of insurance to the jury.' 32
It seems clear that in light of the Supreme Court's holding in
Hanna v. Plumer,33 the Cisco decision is correct.134 Hanna was
one of several federal cases following the landmark decision of
Erie Railroad v. Tompkins,'35 which announced the broad proposi-
tion that in diversity cases the federal courts were to apply substan-
tive state law and federal procedural rules. After this decision the
federal courts faced the persistent problem of how to deal with the
scope and application of Erie. The Court in Hanna distinguished
Erie, stating that the rule set forth there was not the proper one
when a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure was applicable. Chief Jus-
tice Warren stated:
When a situation is covered by one of the Federal Rules, the
question facing the court is a far cry from the typical, relatively
unguided Erie choice: the court has been instructed to apply the
Federal Rule, and can refuse to do so only if the Advisory Com-
mittee, this Court, and Congress erred in their prima facie judg-
ment and the Rule in question transgresses neither the terms of the
Enabling Act nor constitutional restrictions.136
13154 F.R.D. 181 (D. Mont. 1972).
1321d. at 182.
'3 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
'
3 4 See 1 S. JACOBY, supra note 7, at 167; 3A J. MOORE, supra note 49, 5 18.08[2],
at 2013-14 (2d ed. 1970).
135 304 U.S. 64 (1938). See generally C. WRIGHT, supra note 12, §§ 54-60.
136 380 U.S. at 471.
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In other words, in a diversity case a federal court must apply a
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure, if valid, even in the face of con-
trary state substantive law. This is precisely what the court did in
Cisco. While it is perhaps arguable that federal diversity cases
such as Lattavo, which were decided before Hanna, were correct
when decided, they clearly cannot be controlling today for they
looked to factors other than validity of Federal Rule 18(b). Since
18(b) is a valid Rule of procedure, 37 a federal court must apply it
in a diversity case and allow the joinder of the defendant's insurer
even if doing so will conflict with state substantive law. And al-
though a state court is not faced with the same problems facing a
federal court in a diversity case, this is equally true of a state court
in a state which has enacted the equivalent of Federal Rule 18 (b).1a8
This provides yet another means of distinguishing Lattavo, for by
enacting Rule 18(B), Ohio has provided a statutory means for join-
ing an insurer with its insured. Therefore, Lattavo, which rested
in part on the fact that Ohio had no such statute and that Ohio law
did not permit joinder in a contingent liability situation, can have
no effect today, and the Ohio Rules Advisory Committee Staff Note
to 18(B), which cited Lattavo as authority for disallowing join-
der, is clearly erroneous. Ohio Rule 18(B) is a valid procedural
Rule which may be used by a plaintiff, along with Rule 20 (A), to
join the defendant's insurer.140
V. CONCLUSION
This Note has considered the desirability and legality of per-
mitting plaintiffs in personal injury litigation to join the defen-
dant's insurance company as a party-defendant. Although tradi-
tionally such joinder has not been permitted in Ohio, the new Ohio
137 Huntress v. Estate of Huntress, 235 F.2d 205, 208 (7th Cit. 1956).
1 3 8 See notes 112-25 supra & accompanying text. Article IV, section 5(B) of the
Ohio Constitution, which confers rulemaking power on the Ohio Supreme Court, is, in
pertinent part, identical to the Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1970), which
confers such power on the United States Supreme Court. Since Federal Rule 18(b) is
valid when measured against the requirements of the Enabling Act, Ohio Rule 18 (B),
when measured against the Ohio Constitution, is equally valid and must be applied.
139 See note 9 supra.
140 This conclusion is bolstered by considering other contingent liability areas where
joinder under Federal Rule 18(b) has been permitted. See, e.g., Miller's Nat'l Ins.
Co. v. Wichita Flour Mills Co., 257 F.2d 93, 103-04 (10th Cir. 1958); Decatur Coca-
Cola Bottling Co. v. Variety Vending Corp., 277 F. Supp. 393 (N.D. Ga. 1967); Smith
v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 30 F.R.D. 540, 543-44 (M.D. Tenn. 1962). Cf. Ohio Rules Ad-
visory Comm. Staff Note to Rule 19.1. See generally 3A J. MOORE, supra note 49, 5
18.08(1], at 2002-03 (2d ed. 1970); 6 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 16, §
1594, at 821-24.
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Rules of Civil Procedure provide the legal means for now allowing
it.
On balance, policy considerations dictate that the defendant's
insurer be joined for the purposes of pleading and discovery. In
most cases the insurer, for all practical purposes, is the real party in
interest. By contract the insurer assumes the role of the named de-
fendant and proceeds to conduct the investigation, gather informa-
tion, and direct the defense of the insured. It is the insurer and not
the defendant who has access to the relevant information needed
by a plaintiff to adequately prepare his case. Yet, if a court is dis-
posed to apply a literal and mechanical interpretation of the party
Rules, the plaintiff's ability to utilize these liberal discovery provi-
sions is significantly limited, since he is forced to use the more ex-
pensive, time-consuming, and burdensome non-party discovery de-
vices to obtain the information. Whatever the relative merits of such
a situation, it appears dear that it thwarts the general scheme estab-
lished by the discovery Rules, which were intended to offer a liti-
gant alternative methods to obtain the information he seeks. Lim-
iting the use of some of these discovery methods to parties is ordi-
narily justifiable because the parties have the information sought
and such restriction minimizes the burdens placed on non-parties.
However, where the non-party is the real party in interest, and
where the non-party rather than the named defendant has the
necessary information, it is unrealistic and inequitable to permit
the non-party to circumvent attempted discovery under the party
Rules. Although a liberal interpretation of the party requirements
will rectify this situation, and may moot the distinction between
the party 'and non-party Rules, there is presently no way, absent
joinder, to ensure such an interpretation. Thus, the only way to
eliminate potential judicial hesitancy to liberally construe the party
Rules and, therefore, the only way to accord the plaintiff the full
benefit of all of the discovery devices, is to permit the joinder of
the insurer for the purposes of discovery.
Ohio Rule 18(B), when measured against article IV, section
5 (B) of the Ohio Constitution, is a valid procedural Rule since it
does not "abridge, enlarge, or modify any substantive right." Since
Rule 18(B) covers the joinder of the plaintiff's claim against the
insured and his contingent claim against the insurer, it may be used,
in conjunction with Rule 20(A), to join the insurer as a party-de-
fendant.
Furthermore, the reasons advanced for not permitting joinder
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are no longer persuasive. O.R.C. section 3929.06 conflicts with
Rule 18(B), and, therefore, is no longer available as a means of
precluding the joinder of the insurer. Nor should contractual "no-
action" clauses be permitted to negate the effect of Rule 18(B), for
to do so deprives the plaintiff of the advantages of joinder while
providing the insurer with no real benefits since its liability will re-
main contingent even if joined. Similarly, any prejudice which the
insurer may suffer as a result of being joined can be obviated through
the use of separate trials under Rules 20(B), 21, and 42(B).
Thus, permitting the joinder of the defendant's insurer is man-
dated by the new Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure as well as by a
balance of the policy reasons for and against such joinder. Only
by allowing it can a result which is equitable to all parties be achieved.
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